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Chapter One: Introduction and Context. 
 
 
Fig.1. Sir George Keith Elphinstone as Admiral Lord Keith, Baron Keith of 
Stonehaven Marischal and Banheath, Viscount Keith,  G.C.B. 
 
 
The Honourable George Keith Elphinstone, of noble but impoverished family, rose from 
the rank of an Able Seamen ultimately to that of Admiral, and was dubbed a Knight 
Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath and created an Irish Baron and British Viscount. He 
spoke precisely once during his fourteen years as a Member of the House of Commons, 
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Westminster Hall.1 Lord Keith’s reticence in the House was only one of the elements of 
his career that was typical of the 182 naval officers who sat in the Commons in the period 
1715-1815. Long absences at sea on active service meant that the attendance of naval 
Members of  Parliament was often patchy at best, illustrated by Elphinstone’s election in 
1796 whilst taking the Cape of Good Hope before passing most of the rest of his term in 
the English Channel, the Mediterranean and Egypt.2 These absences were not 
unprofitable, however, and lucky officers could earn fortunes in prize money that were 
often invested in political careers, with Elphinstone earning 64 000 pounds by 1800.3 
Such sums lubricated social mobility, and in Elphinstone’s case restored the fortunes of 
his family. Born into impoverished nobility, his rise to high rank in the service on his 
own merits and to a seat in the Commons on the interest of his elder brother 
paradoxically show the importance both of meritocratic social mobility and of aristocratic 
patronage in the election of naval officers to Parliament.  
 
Though the contribution of naval officers to debates in the House could be tangential 
verging on the bizarre, as Elphinstone’s curious example shows, their technical expertise 
and professional obligations lent substance, if not always eloquence, to the considerations 
of the Commons on naval matters. Naval officers’ motives for entering Parliament were 
as mixed as their performance in the House. Some obtained a seat as a means of 
furthering their chances of promotion and choice postings. Others were awarded a 
borough as a prize for long and conspicuous service, an honour not free of obligation, 
                                               
1 Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1754-1790,  
3 vols. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964), vol. II, p. 400. 
2 R. G. Thorne, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1790-1820, 3 vols. (London: Secker 
and Warburg, 1986), vol. III, p. 705. 
3 Christopher Lloyd, ed., The Keith Papers, 
 7 
however; officers so rewarded were expected to loyally support the government that 
endorsed their candidature, with the threat of professional atrophy to punish deviation 
from the party line.4 Provided they were loyal supporters, officers elected for Admiralty 
boroughs could expect to remain in their seats for life, although more dramatic exits, 
through death on active duty, electoral defeat or, as in Elphinstone’s happy case, 
elevation to the peerage meant that the manner of naval MPs leaving Parliament was as 
varied as that of their entry. By studying the similarities and differences in the 
parliamentary and naval careers of those officers who sat in the House, we can achieve a 
greater understanding of how those officers resolved the conflicts and exploited the 
opportunities offered by the nexus in their persons of two organizations central to Great 
Britain in the eighteenth century. 
  
Even the most cursory overview of the 182 naval officers who sat in the House of 
Commons between 1715 and 1815 is an undertaking of daunting scale, and this analysis 
is founded upon the work of the History of Parliament Trust. This body was 
commissioned in 1951, publishing its first volumes in 1964 and not completing the 
cataloguing of the period under study until 1986. This organization, originally overseen 
by the great parliamentary historian Sir Lewis Namier, has collated into ten stout volumes 
for the period 1715-1815 biographies of every man to sit in the House of Commons, 
encompassing within its complete survey much valuable raw data yet to be fully digested 
or ruminated upon by academia. This comprehensive collation represents a trove of 
information that has until now not been analyzed in a sustained fashion in relation to the 
                                               
4 Romney Sedgwick, The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1715-1754, 2 vols. (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970), vol. I, p. 144. 
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small but significant group of naval officers in Parliament. The editors of the Trust’s 
volumes, Romney Sedgwick for 1715-1754, Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke for 
1754-1790 and R. G. Thorne for 1790-1820, briefly touch on naval MPs in their 
introductory surveys, but their comments are confined to an overview of their respective 
periods. This approach misses substantial change and development over the entire 
eighteenth century, and instead treats naval representation as static, unchanging and 
therefore capable of generalization; Sedgwick devotes just eleven lines to naval officers 
in the House.5  
 
What scholarship that does exist on the interplay between the Parliament and the Royal 
Navy is built upon the work of the Trust, with the most recent example being Stephen 
Conway’s work on the relationship between war, the state and society in the eighteenth 
century, which stresses the limited input of the Navy into political life. Conway lumps the 
Navy together with the Army, a service of very different character and traditions in 
stating that between 1754 and 1774 naval and army officers never comprised more than 
16% of MPs, creating a picture of heterogeneity and minimal importance erected entirely 
upon Namier’s and Brooke’s brief summary.6 More critically, N.A.M. Rodger, himself 
drawing upon the relevant volumes of the Trust’s work, deals thoroughly with naval 
MPs, carefully examining the relationship between professional service, patronage and 
parliamentary representation, though his study is confined only to a snapshot of the Navy 
                                               
5 Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754, vol. I, p. 144. 
6 Stephen Conway, War, State and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 140. 
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during the Seven Years’ War.7 What has yet to be attempted is to build upon the History 
of Parliament Trust’s admirable groundwork to examine in what ways naval 
representation changed over a substantial period of time. Such an analysis, illustrating 
and illuminating with salient case studies the statistical trends apparent from the study of 
the Trust’s information, reveals the characteristics and role of naval officers sitting in the 
Commons to be a more dynamic and variable phenomenon than hitherto thought, when 
considered over a sort of salty longue duree. The purpose of this thesis is in large part to 
raise awareness of a field which has remained thus far largely fallow and unstudied in a 
systematic way, a field that would reward further study. Though this work integrates 
contemporary naval and parliamentary scholarship in order to properly contextualize its 
findings, it is original in much of its analysis. Perhaps the greatest value of this thesis’ 
original statistical analysis, leavening graphs delineating clear change with anecdote and 
example, is in adumbrating avenues leading beyond the scope of this work, indicating 
areas in need of fuller exploration. 
 
While academia has not thus far systematically examined the role of naval officers in the 
House of Commons or of Members of Parliament in the Navy, the possibilities inherent 
in the fusion of professional and parliamentary positions was realized by the great 
novelist of Britain’s Navy in the Napoleonic Wars, Patrick O’Brian. In The Letter of 
Marque, the twelfth book of his voluminous series, O’Brian has his hero Captain Jack 
Aubrey, of respectable gentry stock, offered the fictitious seat of Milport when it is 
vacated on the death of his father by his cousin, who neatly sums up both the process and 
                                               
7 N. A. M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis, ML: Naval Institute 
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potential of occupying a seat in Parliament: “Could you not spend an afternoon at 
Milport, to meet the electors? There are not many of them, and those few are all my 
tenants, so it is no more than a formality; but there is a certain decency to be kept up…I 
thought it might strengthen your hand in any dealings with the government. There is not 
much merit in being a Member of Parliament, unless perhaps you represent your county; 
but at least a Member with merit of his own is in a position to have it recognized. He can 
bite as well as bark.”8 It is significant that O’Brian’s work, a comprehensive social 
reconstruction of early nineteenth century naval life, creates a parliamentary career for 
his main protagonist Captain Aubrey, a naval officer par excellence distilled from the 
careers of several real officers.  
 
This foray into historical fiction shows the importance that minds that have taken a more 
creative approach to the Navy as an organizational and social totality attach to the 
prominence of parliamentary connections in the careers of many sea officers. Such an 
approach offers a more meaningful insight on the Navy than the arid study of strategy 
and tactics in isolation of their wider context that characterized naval scholarship until 
recently.9 This aspect of naval history has not thus far been studied in anything further 
than cursory generalizations, and would repay a survey such as this one of how the 
background, selection, election and practices of naval MPs changed over a hundred years. 
For the purposes of analyzing change over time, the chronological divisions of the Trust’s 
volumes have been retained. Although the periods 1715-1754, 1754-1790 and 1790-1820 
mark significant elections, they serve equally well for naval history, roughly marking 
                                               
8 Patrick O’Brian, The Letter of Marque (London: Harper Collins, 1988), p. 228. 
9 N.A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain 1649-1815 (London, Penguin 
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significant naval epochs: the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1713 and the 
outbreak of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 and the  Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
in 1793, with this study ending in 1815 at the close of that conflict in the middle of the 
Parliament of 1812.10 Based upon the extensive collation of raw data by the History of 
Parliament Trust, an analysis of the changing nature of naval representation within the 
House of Commons yields a richer understanding of how power relationships were 
mediated between merging political and professional elites as naval officers became 
Members of Parliament in increasing numbers. 
  
The Parliament that naval officers sat in throughout the period was unreformed, with the 
suffrage and franchise of individual seats varying in a system of Byzantine complexity. 
Parliamentary boroughs had remained fixed for centuries despite substantial demographic 
change, creating an “obsolete distribution of seats naturally producing electoral 
absurdities and corruption.”11 Restrictions of the franchise, differing in complexity and 
nature from seat to seat, meant that few boroughs represented more than 500 voters, and 
many were inhabited by a hundred or fewer, with occasional ‘rotten boroughs’ such as 
Buckingham returning two Members to Parliament to represent precisely thirteen voters 
in the first half of the century.12 This meant that many boroughs were small enough that, 
through judicious cultivation of a tiny electorate, a local magnate could become the 
patron of a seat, with either the formal right or customary privilege of nominating 
candidates, who would be dutifully elected by the voters in return for their patron’s good 
                                               
10 Andrew Lambert, War at Sea in the Age of Sail, 1650-1850 (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 104, 114, 150. 
11 Sir Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan, 
1960), p. 63. 
12 Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754, vol. I, p. 197. 
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offices, entertainments and preferments.13 With patronage sufficient to confidently 
command an electoral result, otherwise known as ‘interest,’ largely vested in the hands of 
landed elites,14 many men, including naval officers, entered Parliament on their family’s 
patronage. Others owed their seats to the friendship of patrons who often turned their 
interest to profitable advantage by returning candidates amenable to the government for 
fee or favours.  
 
While many naval officers successfully navigated the intricate labyrinth of private 
patronage and obligation that was the most common path into eighteenth century politics, 
there was a simpler and more direct route into the House of Commons, related to the 
sheer gravity that the Navy exerted on the nation by virtue of its vast network of logistical 
support. Along with Treasury, Revenue Commissions, Secretariats of State and the Board 
of Trade, supporting the Navy was among the most important and demanding functions 
of eighteenth century British government.15 The Royal Navy was throughout the century 
the largest organization in Great Britain,16 and the massive investment in infrastructure 
such as dockyards and arsenals necessary to keep its fleets at sea represented an 
important source of employment for skilled enfranchised craftsmen in many port towns. 
Military spending absorbed over half of government expenditure, rising in wartime to 
61% in the War of American Independence and 71% in the Seven Years’ War, and even 
                                               
13 Norma Landau, ‘Independence, Deference, and Voter Participation: The Behaviour of the Electorate in 
Early-Eighteenth-Century Kent,’ The Historical Journal, 22, no.3 (September 1979), p. 582. 
14 Peter Jupp, ‘The Landed Elite and Political Authority in Britain, ca. 1760-1850,’ The Journal of British 
Studies, 29, no.1 (January 1990), p. 58. 
15 John Brewer, ‘Officialdom of Eighteenth-Century English Central Government’, in John Brewer and 
Eckhart Hellmuth, eds., Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 127 
16 Michael Duffy, ‘The Foundations of British Naval Power’, in Michael Duffy, ed., The Military 
Revolution and the State 1500-1800
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though these figures also include the Army’s budget, they give some idea of the impact of 
the armed forces, particularly the Navy as the senior service, upon the British nation 
during the eighteenth century.17 A more concrete idea of the sheer scale of the Navy’s 
operations is suggested by its expansion from a wartime complement of 49, 860 officers 
and men in 1714, the year before this study, to a peak of 147, 087 in 1813 just before its 
close, with a commensurate increase in budget from 1,157, 642 to 23, 716, 390 pounds 
respectively.18   
 
Keeping  so many thousands of men at sea for extended periods in vessels of advanced 
technical complexity required vast amounts of food, seasoned masts and timber, cordage, 
ironwork and other assorted materiel, supplied by an army of artisans and contractors 
ashore in large proto-industrial complexes. For example, the docks and shipyards of 
Portsmouth were described by Daniel Defoe as early as the 1720s as being “like a town 
by themselves and are a kind of marine corporation.”19 The scale and scope of naval 
administration is attested by the many coordinating and supervisory positions that existed 
at the Admiralty offices in Whitehall alone, including the posts of Mechanist, Chemist, 
Metal Master, Inspectors of Telegraphs and of Repairs under an Inspector General, not to 
mention Chief, Senior, Junior, Extra, Supernumerary and Temporary Clerks, and a 
“Necessary Woman” to keep house for them all.20 It is by virtue of this extensive 
employment, with enfranchised, skilled dockyard employees beholden to the Navy and 
                                               
17 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1989), p. 40. 
18 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp .636-637, 643-645. 
19 Daniel Defoe, A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain (1724-1726), quoted in P. N Furbank, 
W. R. Owens and A. J. Coulson, eds., A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain (London, Folio 
Society, 2006), p. 68. 
20 J. Sainty, Admiralty Officials 1660-1870
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its political heads for their sustenance, that the government could almost assure the return 
of candidates for ten seats on the ‘Admiralty interest.’ This extensive patronage meant 
that naval officers were regularly returned for the dockyard boroughs of Dartmouth, 
Plymouth, Portsmouth, Rochester, Saltash and Sandwich, while the great arsenal at 
Woolwich gave the Admiralty joint control of Queenborough, shared with the Ordnance 
Board.21 Although the Navy wielded great influence in these boroughs, its power was not 
absolute, and it was assailed by several challenges to its patronage, like the “revolt” 
against the Admiralty’s nominations in the 1770s by leading religious dissenters in the 
voting community,22 or the attempt by John Buller to wrest a controlling interest in 
Saltash from the Admiralty in the 1780s.23 Despite these challenges, the Admiralty 
retained fairly stable control over its ten seats, keeping open an avenue to Parliament 
otherwise not open to aspiring officers of few connections.  The twofold path into 
Parliament, via public or private patronage, helped shape the differing experiences of 
naval officers sitting in the House of Commons, influencing their political behaviour 
according to their background and political obligations.  
 
To contextualize such behaviour, it is important to understand the place of the Royal 
Navy and its commanders in eighteenth century society, ideology and popular imagining 
if we are to reach meaningful conclusions about the character and activities of naval 
officers sitting in Parliament. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain was a vigorous 
imperial power, and the nation’s interminable embroilments, particularly with France, 
                                               
21 Rodger, The Wooden World, p. 329. 
22 Namier, The Structure of Politics, p. 137. 
23 Ian Christie, ‘Private Patronage versus Government Influence: John Buller and the Contest for Control of 
Parliamentary Elections at Saltash 1780-1790,’ The English Historical Review, 71, no. 279 (April 1956), p. 
251. 
 15 
meant that for much of the period under consideration, Britain was at war, and the Navy 
was a major medium of mediating contact between the British people and assorted 
foreign foes.24 This is significant, because the many victories of the Navy over the course 
of the century ensured that it enjoyed a prominent place in the public eye at a time when 
an ideology of particularism was forming. The Navy helped foster a sense of unique 
Britishness based upon geography, language and culture to create a belief in an “Island 
Race” distinct from the rest of Europe,25 a group that manifested its growing self-
confidence in “bellicose popular imperialism.”26  
 
Burgeoning national pride, amply evidenced by the origin in the eighteenth century of 
many familiar songs of British patriotism such as Rule Britannia, God Save the King and 
Hearts of Oak,27 was grounded both upon external foundations in wartime successes, but 
also internally upon the perceived essential excellence of British constitutional 
arrangements. Great Britain was lauded as a land of civil liberties, which were articulated 
in philosophy by the Whig placeman John Locke28 and, more accessibly, through music 
in George Frederick Handel’s favourable comparison of Britain to the felicity of a 
delivered Israel in Old Testament oratorios.29 Parliament, though badly in want of reform 
                                               
24 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
1994), pp. 31, 57, 65, 162-167. 
25 Kathleen Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century (London: 
Routledge, 2003), p. 55. 
26 Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 105. 
27 Simon Schama, A History of Britain: The British Wars 1603-1776 (London: Butler and Tanner, 2001), p. 
397. 
28 H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 67. 
29 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 
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to correct abuses of rotten boroughs and rampant nepotism, nonetheless embodied these 
virtues as the seat of the rights of free-born Englishmen.30  
 
The Navy had an unambiguous place in this ideological system, which combined its 
credentials as the prime instrument of imperial expansion and the defence of the unique 
British Isles from invasion by foreign tyrants who would challenge its particular liberties 
with freedom from the ideological taint suffered by standing armies as traditional tools of 
oppression.31 In contrast to the Army, the Navy, and in particular the admirals under 
whose command its victories were won, were “among Britannia’s most cherished 
guardians, the seaborne defenders of king, constitution and country,” as demonstrated in 
Figure 2,  a typical print of the period. The Navy and its sailors served as allegorical 
shorthand to embody the patriotic, anti-Catholic spirit of a Protestant island battling 
Catholic foes.32 An idea of the ideological investment and sense of involvement the 
nation had in the Navy is revealed in the relief felt at the vindication of Admiral Keppel 
after a controversial court-martial in 1779, when the news was rushed by special couriers 
from Portsmouth to the London presses within six hours.33 The perceived importance of 
the Navy to the health of the body politic is captured by a comment in an issue of the 
Gentleman’s Magazine in 1803, which was referring to ideological as well as physical 
                                               
30 P. D. G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 
pp. 14-15. 
31 Dickinson, Liberty and Property, p. 81. 
32 Gerald Jordan and Nicholas Rogers, ‘Admirals as Heroes: Patriotism and Liberty in Hanoverian 
England,’ The Journal of British Studies, 28, no.3 (July 1989), pp. 202, 205. 
33 Douglas Hay and Nicholas Rogers, Eighteenth-Century English Society: Shuttles and Swords (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 10. 
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fitness when it asserted that “the anchor of Great Britain is the constitutional courage of 
her seamen.”34 
 
 
Fig.2. A popular view of the Navy: Gillray’s Fighting for the Dunghill: or Jack Tar 
settling Citoyen Francois. 
 
 
If contact between an increasingly patriotic British public and the outside world was in 
large part mediated through the actions of the Royal Navy, reported in widening circles 
by the expanding reach of print culture,35 the House of Commons was a similarly 
important point of interface between the Navy and the public. The presence in this 
chamber of 182 naval officers between 1715 and 1815 integrated them into the political 
life of the nation, representing not only particular boroughs, but also the Navy itself in 
formative debates on naval and national policy. That so many prominent naval figures of 
                                               
34 Gerald Jordan and Nicholas Rogers, ‘Admirals as Heroes,’ p. 224. 
35 Harris, Politics and the Nation
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this period sat in the House of Commons, including names such as Vernon, Anson, 
Hawke, Howe, Rodney, Pellew, Hood, Jervis, Nelson, Elphinstone, Cochrane and many 
more, is testament to the nexus that existed between the Navy and Parliament, a 
connection reinforced in the eyes of the public by the proliferation of prints and 
memorabilia that was a prominent expression of an exponentially expanding consumer 
culture.36 In fact, with the exception of Nelson, the vast majority of fleet commanders of 
this period sat in the House, along with many more officers of less glamorous personal 
distinction. Even Nelson, who never aspired to the Commons himself, nonetheless 
enjoyed the benefits of naval MPs sitting in the House through the professional patronage 
of his uncle Maurice Suckling, Member for Portsmouth and Comptroller of the Navy.37  
 
The presence of these officers in the Commons, coupled with a compatible ideology that 
vested both Parliament and the Navy with protection of English liberties, meant that the 
character of naval representation was bound to be a complex interplay of personal, 
professional, parliamentary and public interests. Though these interactions can only be 
touched upon or hinted at in a work of this scope, that they were felt to be important in 
the eighteenth century, and therefore worthy of study in attempting to understand the 
period, is attested by the conflation of all the abovementioned themes in panegyrics such 
as this example to Admiral Vernon in 1741: 
 
Loyal to Majesty, to Britain true: 
His Country’s Welfare ever in his View, 
No Party Faction e’er his mind cou’d scare, 
                                               
36 Neil McKendrick, John Brewer and J. H. Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The 
Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England (London: Europa Publications, 1982), p. 9. 
37 Terry Coleman, Nelson: The Man and the Legend (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), p. 18. 
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Bold in the senate House and Brave at War, 
Britains [sic] revere with all the love you can, 
The Patriot Hero and the Honest man.38 
 
 
                                               
38
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Chapter Two: Identity and Incentive: Who were Naval 
MPs, and why did they enter Parliament? 
 
Before examining the place of naval officers in Parliament, it would be instructive to 
consider the place that representing a borough had in the careers of those officers, for an 
understanding of the age and rank of officers entering the Commons is a useful indication 
of possible motivations for sitting in the House. Promotions in the eighteenth century 
Navy were a combination of meritocratic assessment by examination, reward for service, 
patronage and the inexorable march of seniority.1 An aspiring officer could only obtain a 
commission as a Lieutenant after satisfying an Examining Board of Captains that he 
possessed the technical proficiency necessary to coordinate the complex machinery of a 
sailing warship,2 a practice in stark contrast to the Army which had no such quality 
control at entry level, and where commissions up to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel were 
available by purchase.3 The next step on the professional ladder for a Lieutenant was to 
the rank of Captain which, whether directly or via the intermediate rank of Commander, 
was indissolubly linked to being posted to a ship rated as a Captain’s command, hence 
the older title of Post-Captain.4  
 
As the choice of who should be posted to what command ultimately rested with the First 
Lord of the Admiralty,5 the political head of the Navy, it is at this stage of an officer’s 
career that patronage and interest played the most important role. After that, once on the 
                                               
1 Rodger, The Wooden World, pp. 273-302. 
2 Geoffrey Callender, The Naval Side of British History 1485-1945 (London: Christophers, 1952), p. 109. 
3 H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 54. 
4 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 204. 
5 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, p. 515. 
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Captains’ List, naval officers were almost certain to achieve flag rank and die as 
Admirals provided they lived long enough, though patronage still exerted an influence in 
deciding which officers should be awarded glorious and lucrative commands, and to 
which should be relegated tedious, thankless tasks like convoy duty.  
 
Given the nature of promotion in the eighteenth century, it would be expected that a seat 
in Parliament would be of most use in being made Captain of a post-ship and starting to 
accumulate the seniority that further advancement relied upon; however this was not so. 
As Figure 3 demonstrates, for the vast majority of naval officers throughout the period, a 
seat in Parliament came too late in the trajectory of their careers to be of assistance in 
promotion, with an overwhelming majority of naval MPs already Post-Captains or higher 
when they entered the House, up to 93% between 1715 and 1754, 94% between 1754 and 
1790 before dropping to a still overwhelming 84% between 1790 and 1815. The ages at 
which officers entered Parliament, with some nepotistic exceptions like the Honourable 
John Rodney, Post-Captain at the age of fifteen,6 also reflect the fact that a seat in 
Parliament generally came later in officers’ careers. Officers of common birth entered the 
House on average at 43 years of age, while those of aristocratic background enjoyed a 
substantially lower average of 31 years of age on entry, reflecting the advantages of birth 
into families with substantial, sometimes controlling influence in smaller boroughs. 
Although there is a slight increase in the number of junior officers in the final third of the 
century, testament to aristocratic officers entering Parliament, often at a very tender age, 
for family boroughs as discussed below, the predominant trend was that a seat in 
                                               
6 Rodger, The Wooden World, p .326. 
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Parliament was only of the most tangential importance to professional advancement, if at 
all.  
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Fig.3. Naval officers’ rank on entering Parliament. 
 
 
This study has yielded very few instances of the application of direct political pressure in 
Parliament in return for promotion. The most salient example is an instance in 1762, 
when the Earl of Galloway stipulated that his son, the Honourable Keith Stewart, should 
be promoted to the rank of Captain in return for surrendering his seat as part of a complex 
electoral settlement known as the Galloway compromises.7 Similarly, in 1753, the Prime 
Minister, Henry Pelham, asked Captain William Trelawny to defer his ambition to enter 
Parliament as the candidates had already been settled for the 1754 election. After 
Pelham’s death, Trelawny reminded his successor the Duke of Newcastle that “in the 
                                               
7 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 483. 
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mean time he said he would take care that I lost no ground in my profession by making 
that concession.”8 His patience was rewarded, for Trelawny sat for West Looe from 1757 
to 1767 and was made post in 1756, after having requested of Newcastle in 1755 that he 
be employed “in a station that may not be too much out of reach when I am wanted to 
attend at either of the Looes.”9 Both examples are rather counterintuitive cases of 
professional advancement arising from acquiescing to patrons’ political convenience by 
staying out of the House, while there is no substantial evidence of promotion coming 
from an officer sitting in the House. The closest link between Parliament and promotion 
lies in Sir George Brydges Rodney’s unsuccessful request to have Commander Peard, a 
freemen and voter of Penryn, a borough Rodney hoped to win in 1761, made post as 
Captain of Rodney’s flagship to secure his electoral goodwill. However, this example is 
only indirect, and in any case his practice of advancing “men whose chief or only merit 
was their relevance to Rodney’s political ambitions” in fact placed him in bad odour in 
the service, with his unsuccessful political nominations regularly knocked back.10  
 
With no clear connection between a place in the Commons and promotion, it is at first 
puzzling why a significant number of naval officers sought to sit in Parliament, echoing 
in varying degrees of intensity Sir George Brydges Rodney’s exclamation in 1780 that 
“to be out of Parliament is to be out of the world, and my heart is set upon my being 
in.”11 In Rodney’s case, the urge was so strong that in twenty years of parliamentary life, 
he sat in a total of five seats before his ennoblement- Saltash, Okehampton, Penryn, 
                                               
8 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 561. 
9 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 561. 
10 Rodger, The Wooden World, p. 338. 
11 Namier, The Structure of Politics, p. 1. 
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Northampton and Westminster. Juxtaposed against this furious struggle for incumbency 
is the languid sentiment of then Commander George Stewart, who decided in 1792 after 
lobbying from his seat in the Commons Pitt the Younger, Lord Chatham the First Lord 
and Henry Dundas for promotion that “I need not be very solicitous about Parliament 
since so little fruit is to be reaped from attendance.”12 Given that a seat in the House came 
for most naval officers, as has been demonstrated, at an age and rank in life that meant 
that any political leverage gained from their seat was of little use in direct promotion, the 
indifference of Stewart and the eagerness of Rodney both beg the question of why naval 
officers bothered to pursue a political career at all?  
 
Perhaps the most potent motive enticing naval MPs to sit in the Commons was the 
intrinsic honour, kudos or status that accrued to those who held that position, helping to 
reinforce, or in the case of men of lowly birth to create a sense of identity and place in 
society. Though a seat in the House might not very compatible with a naval career in 
practical terms, it was not inconsistent with an ideology that could apply equally to naval 
and parliamentary service. A shared rhetoric of defending liberty entwined the Navy with 
the Commons, with Parliament being the seat of the rights of free-born Englishmen and 
the “Grand Inquest of the Nation,” in theory preserving liberty from within,13 much as the 
Navy safeguarded those liberties from without. Unlike the Army, the Navy was a benign, 
“constitutionally unthreatening” force compatible with the deeply ingrained distrust in the 
national psyche towards standing armies.14 When the Navy and politics dramatically 
converged in the national consciousness, most particularly in the Keppel-Palliser affair of 
                                               
12 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. V, p. 272. 
13 Thomas, The House of Commons, p. 14. 
14 Conway, War, State and Society, p. 141. 
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1778, the “wooden walls”15 of the fleet became a “bulwark of liberty.”16 Handbills 
entitled “Law, Liberty and Keppel” succinctly encapsulating the perceived link, as did 
more practical spoons and tablecloths bearing simulacra of Sir Joshua Reynolds’ portrait 
(see Figure 15) and the slogan “Keppel and Virtue.”17 The heroes of the Navy were held 
up for their courage and perceived integrity against the supposed corruption of politics 
ashore, as in an expansive Epistle to Admiral Keppel, which contrasted Keppel’s virtue 
with landed vice in flatulent verse: 
 
Hail, to thee, Keppel! from perils saved, 
Worse than thy courage on the deep has braved! 
Trying the hour, when by the whirlwind’s breath 
The billows teemed with darkest forms of death; 
Trying, when England’s dauntless sons oppose 
The shattered ship against her trebled foes; 
But far more trying is Detraction’s dart, 
And the dark stab of ministerial art.18 
 
And so on for twenty pages, suggesting that salt water and active service somehow 
absolved and baptized naval officers from the taint of political jobbery ashore, whereas 
we shall see that in reality naval MPs were intimately involved in the deals and match-
making of eighteenth century politics. While individual heroes like Vernon, Keppel and 
Rodney could be elevated by occasional outpourings of public frenzy to cult status, naval 
officers as a whole benefited from the rising status and social credit of the service 
stemming from the lustre of frequent victories and the gentrification of the officer corps 
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discussed below. This aura of success and capability was manifested in an esteem for the 
Navy as an institution, occasionally approaching reverence, suggested by the naming of 
an ordinary sailor “The British Hercules” in a print of 1737.19 Even Thomas 
Rowlandson’s usually savage satirical pen graced his series of prints of all the ranks in 
the Navy with serene, even simpering visages (Figure 4) in contrast to the grotesqueries 
inflicted upon other groups in contemporary cartoons.20 The standing of the Navy as an 
institution must have impacted upon the electoral desirability of quite unremarkable naval 
officers who aspired to Parliament as well as lionized heroes, though it remains 
undetermined just how appealing a naval uniform was in the eyes of electors of different 
constituencies. Further detailed study of canvassing in individual electorates would 
doubtless reveal nuances behind R. G. Thorne’s general statement that “a naval 
background undoubtedly proved an electoral asset.”21 
 
                                               
19 John Brewer, The Common People and Politics 1750-1790s (Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1986), p. 
66. 
20 A. B. C. Whipple, Fighting Sail (Amsterdam: Time-Life Books, 1978), pp. 20-21. 
21 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. I, p. 317. 
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Fig.4. The Navy idealized: Thomas Rowlandson’s Captain and Sailor. 
 
If naval officers were lent a patina of glamour and status from their profession that could 
be turned to electoral advantage, sitting in the House of Commons also lent a degree of 
status to Naval MPs of humble background, cementing their rise to considerable 
distinction within eighteenth century British society. For officers who entered their 
profession on the lower deck and rose to its apex, like Samuel Cornish, George Darby 
and Thomas Griffin, each beginning their career as Able Seamen and dying Admirals,22 a 
seat in Parliament helped mark their arrival in polite society, showcasing the meritocratic 
elements of the eighteenth century Navy. Apart from the intrinsic honour of a seat in the 
Commons, representing a borough also demonstrated the Navy’s ability to make a man’s 
fortune, particularly through prize money. Throughout our period, members of the House 
of Commons had to hold land worth 600 pounds a year to be eligible to sit in 
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Parliament.23 For naval officers of humble background, a seat in the House was a tangible 
demonstration of their means, or at least connections in the case of Sir Peter Warren, who 
had the necessary property qualifications satisfied by the grace of his Grace the Duke of 
Bedford, Warren’s patron.24 At the other extreme, George Anson, whose share in over a 
million pieces of eight and 35 000 ounces of virgin silver from a Spanish galleon in 
captured in 174325 allowed him to buy such extensive estates in Hedon that, in addition to 
representing it, he obtained a controlling interest in and patronage of the borough.26 
 
Given that most naval officers entering Parliament needed the support of a patron’s 
interest, it is necessary to examine where they sought that sponsorship, and how patterns 
of patronage changed over time. The simplest route into Parliament was to be nominated 
for one of the Admiralty boroughs discussed earlier. Once elected to an Admiralty seat, 
the incumbent was, with very few exceptions, assured a place for life, which was often 
not that long given that these boroughs were often awarded to elderly officers, carried to 
the top of the service by seniority rather than conspicuous service.27 As a proportion of 
seats that returned naval officers to Parliament, those controlled by the Admiralty 
decreased markedly over the century, meaning that naval officers increasingly entered 
Parliament for seats outside the gift of the Admiralty, suggesting an increasing 
integration of naval officers into the sophisticated structures of eighteenth century British 
politics.28 This is largely linked to the rising social status of the officer corps, resulting in 
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and fuelled by an influx into the service and Parliament of officers of aristocratic or 
gentry family.  
 
Blue-blooded officers, however, did not have a monopoly on family interest; some 
commoners had strong local connections to Admiralty seats that allowed them to 
represent them free from government patronage, such as Captain John Spratt Rainier. 29  
Like his uncle Admiral Peter Rainier before him, the younger Rainier represented the seat 
of Sandwich from 1808-1812, both of whom owed their place to the local standing of his 
father, Daniel Rainier, wine merchant and Mayor of  Sandwich.30 In general terms, 
however, naval officers were returned for Admiralty seats based upon the choice of the 
Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and more immediately the First Lord of the Admiralty, with 
a letter from the Duke of Bedford serving in that capacity to Edward Hawke on 18 
December 1747 illustrating how such seats were generally bestowed, in this case 
unanimously by the electors: “I have this day wrote to Mr. Mayor of Portsmouth, 
recommending you to the gentleman of the corporation to be their representative in 
Parliament. I most heartily wish you good success.”31 This sort of patronage was vital 
throughout the century to the careers of men who had risen through the service from very 
humble origins, and whose professional success was a passport to a place in politics.  
 
Though the number of naval MPs increased, the number of naval seats, boroughs in 
which naval installations such as dockyards and arsenals were a major source of 
employment and electoral patronage, remained static, with the Admiralty not expanding 
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its patronage beyond determining who should represent Rochester, Sandwich, Saltash, 
Dover, Great Yarmouth, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Queenborough and Southampton, with 
significant influence in seats such as Bridport and Wexford.32 This meant that as the 
century progressed, the proportion of naval officers sitting in Parliament for seats within 
the gift of their profession declined from nineteen out of forty-two Members between 
1715-1754 to twenty-three out of seventy-five in 1790-1815, a clear decrease from a half 
to a third. When considered in terms of which seats returned naval officers, as shown in 
Figure 5, the trend is even more readily apparent, with seats not within the gift of the 
Admiralty eventually predominating naval seats, though of course these figures yield a 
slightly different result from the total numbers of naval officers in Parliament, as 
examined below. This is because it was not uncommon for Members of Parliament, 
including naval officers, to sit in several seats during the course of one parliamentary 
term due to the constant, turbulent round of challenges, petitions and by-elections that 
characterized eighteenth century politics.33  
 
The drift from reliance on naval patronage to seat naval officers in the Commons is a 
clear explanation for the increasingly diverse political character and affiliations of naval 
MPs opposed to a more settled norm in the earlier half of the century. This quieter time 
was epitomized by Sir Chaloner Ogle, elected to the Admiralty borough of Rochester at 
the age of sixty-six, Admiral of the Fleet and with his most dramatic exploit, the capture 
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of the notorious pirate Bartholomew Roberts forty-four years in the  past, described as 
being “snug at Rochester and will hardly to go to sea any more.”34 
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Fig. 5.The rise in private patronage for naval officers. 
 
Of course, it is important not to overemphasize the impact of social mobility in the still 
highly-stratified world of eighteenth century British politics.35 The rising status of the 
Navy over the period saw a significant change in the nature of naval representation that is 
counterintuitive to the assumption that the social changes that gathered pace throughout 
the eighteenth century promoted the rise of people not from a traditional background of 
public service to positions of power. Though in general terms this assumption is borne 
out in Parliament, with Ian Christie’s research into ‘non-elite’ MPs revealing a steady 
increase from 70 in the Parliament of 1715 to 147 in the Parliament of 1812,36 this trend 
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is not reflected in naval representation in the Commons. Indeed, the composition of naval 
MPs as a group grew more privileged as aristocratic officers became entrenched both in 
the service and in the House. 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, scions of aristocratic families, the overwhelming 
majority of them younger sons, began to join the Navy as the service rose in status, 
receiving an especial boost by George III’s sending his son Prince William Henry to sea 
in 1779.37 By 1800, it has been computed that 11% of naval officers came of titled 
families, with a further 27% from the landed gentry,38 and it is to be expected that the 
proportion of blue-blooded naval MPs, drawn from the upper echelons of the service, 
should reflect this gentrification, which is the case. The number of aristocratic naval 
officers sitting in Parliament corresponded with this trend, and even exceeded it, with 
numbers increasing in raw terms, eleven in 1715-1754 and nineteen in 1754-1790 to 
thirty-four in 1790-1815. Aristocrats also increased as a proportion of naval MPs, with 
officers boasting an aristocratic background comprising 26% of naval representation 
between 1715-1754, rising to 29% in 1754-1790 before jumping to 45% in 1790-1815. 
This influx of aristocratic naval officers found seats in Parliament largely outside the 
electorates in which the Admiralty returned candidates, with naval seats accommodating 
only five aristocratic officers between 1715-1754 and 1790-1815 and four between 1754-
1790. The remainder were brought into the House largely for family seats, relying on ties 
of kin-or-friendship with patrons of boroughs to ensure their return for such electorates. 
The beneficial effect of aristocratic connections on the careers of naval MPs is 
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statistically suggested by the age at which those who represented Admiralty seats first 
entered Parliament compared to men of humbler birth. Such a comparison is illuminating 
because both groups relied on the same source of patronage for Admiralty seats, whereas 
aristocratic officers sitting for family seats often capitalized on their connections to enter 
Parliament soon after their majority. For naval MPs entering Parliament for Admiralty 
seats, scions of aristocratic families first took their seats at the age of 30, compared to a 
markedly more seasoned 47 for commoners. The steady gentrification of naval officers 
was paralleled by the changing character of naval representation in the Commons, clearly 
demonstrating an integration of the officer class into existing traditions of mediating 
power relationships within the landed elite. 
 
Although drawn from an increasingly privileged background, there were nonetheless 
enough naval officers of common birth sitting in the House of Commons to form one of 
the most meritocratic elements in the unreformed Parliament, which can be shown by a 
brief survey of their backgrounds, as in Figure 6.  The biggest proportion of naval MPs 
not from aristocratic families nonetheless came from the gentry, a category vague enough 
to encompass many gradations of prosperity, importance and influence. This category 
included thirteen sons of baronets and ranged from Captain Galfridus Walpole, son of 
Robert Walpole the Prime Minister to Sir John Norris, merely of “respectable Irish 
family.”39  In addition to those whose fathers were of the gentry, seven naval MPs of 
common stock had been preceded by their fathers in the Commons. Not all naval MPs 
enjoyed this generally well-heeled pedigree, and some naval officers sitting in Parliament 
came of very humble parentage indeed. Sir Thomas Troubridge and Charles Vanbrugh’s 
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fathers were both bakers,40 and seven naval MPs’ parentage is unknown, though given 
that of those seven, Vice Admirals George Darby, Thomas Griffin and Samuel Cornish 
all entered the Navy as Able Seamen, it can be assumed that some officers’ births were so 
low as to have been utterly obscured to history.  
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Fig. 6.Parentage of naval officers of common birth in Parliament 
 
Between these extremes was a core of officers whose background was solidly middle-
class and professional. Nine naval MPs were sired by Anglican clergymen, including the 
brothers Hood and Captain John Markham, whose father went on to become Archbishop 
of York,41 in addition to John MacBride, son of a Presbyterian Minister.42 Only one naval 
MP came from a legal background, but that was an exceptional man in the person of Sir 
Edward Hawke.43 Ten officials in the service of the Crown sired naval officers who sat in 
Parliament. These included men with powerful naval connections such as the father of Sir 
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John Jervis, Swynfen Jervis, Auditor of Greenwich Naval Hospital and Solicitor to the 
Admiralty,44 and Piercy Brett and Curtis King, Masters Attendant of Chatham dockyard 
and Woolwich Arsenal, all of whom doubtless exerted their influence at the Admiralty in 
their offspring’s favour.45 Able to offer less immediate assistance to their sons’ 
advancement were other officials such as Sir George Brydges Rodney’s grandfather, 
Envoy to Tuscany, Sir Charles Hardy’s father, Commissioner of Garrisons for Guernsey, 
Sir Isaac Coffin’s, Paymaster of the Customs at Boston, or Charles Pierrepont’s, who 
discharged the picturesque functions of the Deputy Rangership of Richmond Park.46 Even 
more exotic were colonial officials like Thomas Frankland’s father, Governor of Fort 
William in Bengal, John Willett Payne’s, Chief Justice of St Kitts or Henry Martin’s, 
Speaker of the Assembly of Antigua.47 Eight naval officers were from Army families, 
though all younger sons, as were the overwhelming majority of all naval officers, the 
principles of primogeniture vested in eldest sons almost never being jeopardized by a 
dangerous career at sea.48  
 
All naval officers were potentially patrons, especially those of high rank,49 and active 
service together created networks as strong as bonds of political obligation ashore, with 
clear, unbroken lines of senior officers sponsoring protégés’ careers being discernible. 
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For example, Admiral Matthew Aylmer sponsored Sir John Norris’ advancement, a 
relationship sealed by marriage to Aylmer’s daughter, with Norris in turn fostering the 
career of Sir Charles Wager, and so on through Lord George Anson to Sir Charles 
Saunders then Sir Hugh Palliser, creating long lines of professional pedigree that were 
reproduced in Parliament through Admiralty Boroughs.50 Given this established practice 
within the Navy, it is only natural that sons in the service should enjoy the benefit of 
paternal exertions of influence in their favour. Such patronage resulted in thirteen 
commoners sitting in Parliament springing from the salty loins of naval officers. This 
could create dynasties of naval patronage based upon blood to match those founded upon 
the professional relationship between patron and protégé, with the most salient example 
being that of the Bickertons. Sir Richard, Member for Rochester from 1790-92, was the 
third son of Captain Henry Bickerton, and he in turn sired a second Sir Richard 
Bickerton, Member for Poole from 1808-1812. 51 The diversity of backgrounds from 
which naval MPs not of an aristocratic family were drawn shows that the element of 
meritocracy that characterized naval advancement also applied to the representation of 
the service within the House of Commons. 
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Chapter Three: Patronage, Popularity and Polling 
 
 
How the Navy’s variable fortunes in war affected the number of its officers returned as 
Members of Parliament has yet to be considered across the full century of Britain’s rise to 
naval dominance, which this brief overview rectifies. The most simple and direct means 
in which naval representation altered between 1715 and 1815 is in the fluctuating raw 
numbers of naval officers who sat in the House, which was fixed at 558 Members, with a 
further 100 Irish MPs added upon the second Act of Union in 1801.1 The number of 
naval officers returned to each Parliament throughout the century may be seen in Figure 
7, ranging from the ten members in the Parliament of 1727 to a peak of thirty in the 
Parliaments of 1806 and 1807. Although Namier describes the fluctuation in the number 
of naval MPs within his own period of 1754-1790 as “purely adventitious,”2 a survey of 
the rates of representation over the course of a century reveals an interesting trend.  
 
Comparing the number of naval MPs in each Parliament, their presence increased 
markedly in Parliaments formed from general elections close to years of notable naval 
successes, and dipped sharply in years of defeat or controversy. It is not inconceivable 
that the jump from sixteen to twenty-two naval MPs in the election of 1761 was owing to 
the recent spate of victories in which the Navy had a part, such as the capture of Quebec, 
Guadeloupe and Belleisle, as well as the exclusive spoils of the battles of Lagos and 
Quiberon Bay that crowned 1759, a year crowded with British victories.3 This hypothesis 
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is borne out by the election in 1761 of Sir Edward Hawke, Augustus Hervey and Richard 
Howe, victors of Quiberon Bay, Augustus Keppel and Sir Charles Saunders, captors of 
Belleisle and Quebec respectively. Other commanders of the Seven Years’ War elected in 
this year included Sir George Pocock, who had acquitted himself well in a series of 
battles off the Coromandel Coast of India in 1758-1759, as well as the rising star of Sir 
George Brydges Rodney.4  
 
Similarly, the cumulative impact of the controversial engagement off Ushant in 1778, as 
well as the public fissure of the Navy in the Keppel-Palliser affair repeated American 
failures may well be responsible for the general election of 1780 returning only fourteen 
naval officers, the lowest result in the last half century of this study.5 Again, the recovery 
in numbers to twenty-three officers in the election of 1784 may be related to the public’s 
restored confidence in the Navy following battles such as Dogger Bank in 1781 and the 
triumph of Rodney at the Saintes in 1782.6 Of course, the substantial increase of naval 
representation in the final years of this study may be related to the exponential increase of 
the Navy itself during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, with the officer corps 
swelling from 2000 in 1792 to 10 000 by 1806,7 also increasing the pool from which 
naval MPs could be drawn. Nonetheless, the credit that the Navy enjoyed from a string of 
victories in that conflict from the Battle of the Glorious First of June in 1794 to 
Camperdown, Cape St. Vincent, the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar to name the most 
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prominent,8 cannot have failed to impact upon the electoral success of naval officers as a 
group in the final years of the period.  
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Fig.7. Number of naval officers per Parliament 
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Although it would take a comprehensive study of electioneering and popular politics in 
individual constituencies to determine how far the Navy’s success in wartime determined 
the number of officers that were returned to Parliament, the case of Admiral Vernon in 
1741 suggests a strong link between martial and political success. Admiral Vernon’s 
successes in the Caribbean, particularly in the capture of Porto Bello, marked one of the 
first major instances in which a popular patriotic voice was manifested through all forms 
of media from prints and pamphlets to ballads and souvenirs,9 marking the growing 
importance of public opinion in eighteenth-century politics, which was very receptive to 
naval victories and the heroes they produced.10 Victories like Vernon’s were lauded in 
Britain, receiving the official praises and encomiums of both Houses of Parliament.11 
More importantly, events like the capture of Porto Bello were also marked spontaneously 
by the public with such enthusiasm that, apart from bonfires and overflowing panegyrics, 
whole villages were renamed Porto Bello in Staffordshire, Sussex and Durham,12 and 
‘Vernon Mugs’ were successfully marketed by Staffordshire potters.13  
 
Overflowing popular sentiment had an impact on parliamentary powerbrokers such as 
William Pulteney, whose letter to Vernon on 27th March 1740 praised his “late glorious 
success before Porto Bello…it adds greatly to the honour of your enterprise when 
mankind are at a loss to determine whether your conduct, your courage or your humanity 
is most to be admired.”14 These acclamations made Vernon the hero of the hour and a 
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valuable electoral commodity, shown in the general election of 1741 where Vernon was 
nominated at Portsmouth, London, Rochester, Ipswich and Penryn, and was elected for 
the last three, choosing to sit for Ipswich. That a naval hero could be returned for three 
seats simultaneously, and Vernon was assured by the effusive Pulteney that “all places 
that send members to Parliament have been struggling to have you for their 
representative, and, I dare say, you might have been chosen in twenty more places than 
you are,”15 shows the sheer popularity that naval officers could attain. It is likely that the 
sheen of its most prominent heroes, coupled with the success and credit of the naval 
profession as a whole, may have impacted upon the electoral chances of naval officers as 
a group, helping to account for fluctuations in numbers that broadly follow the Navy’s 
fortunes throughout the century. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Admiral Edward Vernon, simultaneously nominated for five seats and 
elected for three. 
                                               
15 Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754
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The sort of successes that lifted the profile of the Navy as a whole had a profound impact 
on the lives of individual officers, often bringing great wealth in the form of prize money 
as well as a public profile that could be turned to parliamentary advantage. Seats like 
Ipswich and Westminster, with enfranchised populations of up to 12 000 out of 158 000 
citizens in 1801 in the case of Westminster, were the closest thing eighteenth century 
Britain knew to democratic suffrage, and these electors had a taste for victorious 
commanders such as Sir Charles Wager, Edward Vernon, Sir George Rodney, Sir Samuel 
Hood and Lord Cochrane.16 For men like Vernon, success was so great as to free them 
from the need to seek a political patron, whose views they would then have to echo in the 
House. Originally elected on the back of a national outpouring of joy at his capture of 
Porto Bello in 1740, Vernon sat for Ipswich for sixteen years despite professional 
disgrace and being struck off the list of flag officers after quarrelling with the Admiralty 
in 1746.17 This lengthy term in Parliament was only made possible by his judicious 
application of prize money to cultivate his own interest “at an immense expense and 
unspeakable trouble,” supporting his erratic course as a “picturesque and turbulent 
politician” outside the usual structures of naval and parliamentary patronage.18  
 
Similarly, a dashing and lucrative career19 allowed the flamboyant, proudly independent 
and originally indigent Captain Lord Cochrane to disburse his glamorously-won prize 
money to secure a seat in the Commons without professional or political support.20 
                                               
16 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. I, p. 316, vol. II, p. 266. 
17 B. Ranft, ed., The Vernon Papers, p. 442. 
18 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 583. 
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(London: Constable, 2001), pp. 154-156, 223-225. 
20 Donald Thomas, Cochrane: Britannia’s Last Sea King 
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Though challenged as apocryphal, Cochrane’s account of his failure at a by-election for 
the venal borough of Honiton in 1806, followed by his subsequent success in the general 
election of the same year show the possibilities open to a naval officer willing to be 
generous with his prize money to secure the desired result. Requesting leave of absence 
to contest the borough from the Port Admiral in Plymouth, which “the prize money 
procured without scruple,” Cochrane records that a voter, expecting that his money would 
be spent “sailor-fashion” in the constituency, told him during his canvass “you need not 
ask me, my Lord, who I votes for, I always votes for Mister Most.”21 Cochrane records 
that he refused to outbid his opponents’ offer of five pounds per vote before the poll but, 
though defeated, rewarded every person who had voted for him with ten pounds after the 
event, assuring his popularity in the borough for the general election a few months later.22  
 
Cochrane says he was returned on the rapacious voters’ expectation of “post-facto 
consideration” as in his earlier failed election, but that this time he refused to pay the 
expected donatives on account of his reforming principles. Subsequent scholarship 
suggests that, in spite of his radical rhetoric, Cochrane in fact paid the usual douceurs for 
his election.23 Nevertheless, the powerful nexus between a successful naval officers’ 
supposed wealth, fame and his electoral appeal is clearly exhibited by Cochrane’s 
arriving in Honiton for the general election in a coach and six, followed by several 
                                               
21 Brian Vale, ed., Memoirs of a Fighting Captain: Admiral Lord Cochrane (London: The Folio Society, 
2005), p. 71. 
22 Brian Vale, ed., Admiral Lord Cochrane, p. 72. 
23 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. III, p. 462.  
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carriages filled with officers and seamen from the frigate under his command in a potent 
display of political theatre.24  
 
 
Fig. 9. Captain Lord Cochrane, who turned his prize money into votes. 
 
Officers such as Vernon and Cochrane who enjoyed enough popular appeal to be 
independent in politics were generally looked upon by successive governments with 
wariness ranging to outright hostility. When popularity was tinged with notoriety, as in 
the case of the Keppel-Palliser Affair, where naval affairs and politics sharply intersected 
in the highly publicized courts-martial25 following the Battle of Ushant in 1778, 
administrations could move to neutralize naval officers who might prove rallying points 
                                               
24 Brian Vale, ed., Admiral Lord Cochrane, p. 83. 
25 Rogers, Crowds, Culture and Politics, p. 138.  
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of opposition in the House. Admiral Keppel, who at the peak of his popularity was 
preceded by a band playing “See, the Conquering Hero Comes!”26 and was presented 
upon his acquittal in 1779 by Trinity House with a “Freedom Box” engraved with figures 
of Britannia and Neptune paying him homage,27 had his patronage withdrawn for the seat 
of Windsor in 1780, which he had represented since 1761. The extent of ministerial 
animosity towards Keppel is suggested by the London Courant’s report on 11 September 
1780 that “every nerve was strained by government,” which enfranchised enough 
retainers of the Royal Household overnight to defeat Keppel by sixteen votes.28 Though 
Keppel was found a seat in Surrey by Opposition Whigs,29 the incident demonstrates the 
contingent nature of parliamentary representation, largely dependent upon patrons’ 
wishes, which most naval MPs not of Vernon’s, Keppel’s or Cochrane’s celebrity had to 
respect if they wished to remain in the House.  
 
Though without the public esteem, sometimes adulation, that naval heroes enjoyed, even 
officers with quite unremarkable careers clearly remained sought after as candidates, 
bringing in their persons the dignity of the Navy as an institution to bear at the hustings. 
This could be particularly useful when candidates were not returned unanimously, as 
understood by a fretting Earl St Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty, in a letter on 7 July 
1802: “I am extremely concerned to learn that the peace of the County of Stafford is 
likely to be disturbed by a contested election.”30 While few naval officers could match 
                                               
26 Whipple, Fighting Sail, p. 32. 
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Admiralty 1801-1804
 47 
Cochrane’s popularity and force of personality, qualities that made him, like Keppel and 
Vernon before him, secure without need of family interest in a seat that provided a 
platform for taking an independent line in politics, the naval character of candidates 
remained an electoral asset. A naval uniform was felt to increase an officer’s chance of 
success when coupled with patronage and interest in an age when in many seats, such as 
Dartmouth in 1757, made it known that “the corporation [of the borough] have desired a 
sea-man,”31 or Sandwich in 1812, where they were “crying out for a naval man.”32 
 
                                               
31 Rodger, The Wooden World, p. 330. 
32 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820
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Chapter Four: Members of Parliament at sea, Naval 
Officers in the Commons 
 
The demands of the service made great inroads into the time of naval officers, often 
detaining them in distant quarters of the globe for years on end. This had an 
understandable impact upon the attendance in the House of many naval MPs still on 
active duty, and in fact the globetrotting nature of a naval career represented the greatest 
conflict between professional and parliamentary loyalties. While of course many naval 
officers entered Parliament at such an advanced age and rank that active service at sea 
was no longer a serious option for them, there were many for whom long absences 
occasioned by naval duties rendered their attendance on the House often purely nominal, 
and sometimes non-existent. Stopgap candidates might serve their entire term overseas, 
or even without knowing they were Members of Parliament at all.  
 
The short Parliament of 1806-1807 was an exemplar of such enforced absenteeism, with 
James Athol Wood in the Caribbean for the whole session.1 Similarly, the Honourable 
Robert Stopford and Duncombe Pleydell Bouverie doubtless consoled each other on their 
absence from the House for the entirety of the Parliament of 1806-1807 while serving 
together off the River Plate in South America.2 Equally galling was the case of Lord 
Robert Manners, elected in his absence “after a bitter and expensive contest” and killed in 
the Battle of the Saintes without setting foot in Parliament, or the Honourable Edward 
Legge, elected posthumously.3 Such instances were of course extreme, and were far 
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outweighed by the many officers who were only absent intermittently, though it was not 
uncommon for more than half of a naval MP’s term in the House to be spent at sea or, in 
the unfortunate case of Captain Edward Leveson-Gower, as a prisoner of war in France 
for three out of the five years he represented Truro.4  
 
 
Fig. 10. Captain the Honourable Robert Stopford, who spent his entire 
Parliamentary career off South America. 
 
It is difficult to quantify the precise extent of absenteeism caused by naval service, given 
that the sea-time of 71 out of 182 naval MPs is not recorded in the History of Parliament 
Trust’s volumes, and any absences occasioned by naval duties are not recorded in a 
consistent way.  Some officers’ absences are captured in rich detail, recording where they 
were posted and how long they spent there, while others are marked only with the 
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suggestive but unhelpful phrase of “infrequent attendance.” Despite the incompleteness 
of the data, however, the fact that over half of all officers had absences at sea noted is an 
indication that the phenomenon had a substantial impact on the group as a whole, even on 
the unlikely assumption that those without recorded absences were perfect attenders. 
Absences occasioned by official duty could last for years at a time, with Sir George 
Elphinstone providing a not uncommon example. He was elected for Stirlingshire while 
at the Cape of Good Hope in 1796, before serving with the Channel Fleet in 1797 and 
then on the Mediterranean station from 1798-1801 when he was elevated to the House of 
Lords, clearly leaving little time for attendance on the House.5 Likewise, Lord William 
Fitzroy is not atypical in taking his seat in the House in 1810, four years into a six-year 
term.6 Though mainly caused by active service, such absences were also partly due to the 
time delay inherent in eighteenth century communications, even in the relative proximity 
of the Mediterranean. Here, Augustus Hervey’s notification of his election in 1757 came 
from the Governor of Nice and Lieutenant General in the Sardinian service 
(incongruously named General Paterson), between dinner and the opera when “His 
Excellency shewed me an English newspaper that told me I was returned Member for 
Bury,” outrunning by more than a month the letter from “Brother Bristol,” the 2nd Earl, 
Hervey’s patron and elder brother.7 
 
Even postings within the United Kingdom entailed duties that could keep naval MPs 
from the House for long periods, like Vice Admiral James Steuart, described in 1747 as 
                                               
5 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. III, p.705. 
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having “a command at Portsmouth which has kept him from attending Parliament as 
much as if he had been in the West Indies.”8 Likewise, Captain Nicholas Robinson’s 
seven years in Parliament between 1734 and 1741 were not unprofitably employed 
earning 500 pounds per annum in command of a sloop to prevent smuggling.9 It is also 
possible that, in addition to formal postings, a hard life at sea may have broken down the 
health of several naval officers pleading illness to excuse their absence, thus impacting on 
their presence in the Commons, while the accidental impact of a sounding lead during 
training at Spithead on the head of Vice Admiral the Honourable Hugh Seymour Conway 
in 1791 retarded his attendance in the House by incapacitating him for two years.10  
 
Though the exigencies of the service certainly had a profound effect on the time that 
naval MPs could spend in the House, these absences have to be measured against the 
standards of the times. It must be remembered that government in the eighteenth century 
was in general characterized by laxity and absenteeism. Many Members of Parliament 
regularly neglected their duties in the House with a cavalier negligence that might be 
shocking to modern sensibilities, inventing excuses to avoid the official summons known 
as the Call of the House, or ignoring it entirely.11 Indolent, stay-at-home civilian MPs 
could choose to attend the House or not to suit their own purposes and, even if they did 
not attend, could be in regular contact with news from the capital through the post and 
press. Naval MPs, however, were often posted to parts of the world where letters might 
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take up to a year to be answered,12 effectively quarantining them from actively 
capitalizing upon their place in the Commons. With their presence in the House 
hampered by active service, Naval MPs as a group can be fairly summed up by the 
laconic description in Robinson’s electoral survey of 1780: “he is not a good attender.”13 
 
Many active sea officers tried to strike a balance between their professional service and 
parliamentary representation by seeking leave of absence from their commands, with 
varying degrees of success. John Spratt Rainier, Sir Charles Hamilton and the 
Honourable Charles Paget all sought leave of absence from the Navy, in Rainier’s case 
being “very desirable to remain on shore in attendance on the House of Commons.”14 
This was clearly a compromise solution, and Westminster powerbrokers trying to 
maintain a parliamentary majority remained frustrated at sea officers’ continual absences, 
with an extreme case being Lord William Stuart, whose grandfather and patron, the 
Marquess of Bute, was pressured to nominate another candidate for his seat of Cardiff 
Boroughs on account of Stuart’s always being at sea.15 Though many naval MPs made an 
attempt to balance their professional and parliamentary obligations, some were obdurate 
to the point of petulance in avoiding the House, particularly Captain Frederick Cornewall, 
who bore away the palm for absenteeism. Cornewall was Member for Montgomery 1771-
1774 and an invalid after losing his right arm off Toulon in 1744, as Lord Nelson was to 
do in 1797 at Tenerife. The resemblance ended there, however, as Cornewall lacked 
Nelson’s dash and activity; indeed he never spoke or even voted in the House, and his 
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term seems to have been taken up largely in correspondence as to why he could not 
attend. He complained in February 1773 that “the papers say there will be a Call of the 
House in about a fortnight. If there is I beg you will excuse me. I cannot plead my health 
which is better than it has been for many years,” and tried a different tack  in December 
1773: “By a letter I received last post from Lord North desiring my attendance at the 
beginning of the sessions as things of importance were expected to come under 
consideration. I fear a long attendance may be detrimental, as I never am well in the 
smoke of London,”16 and so on in two more letters, demonstrating the sheer intransigence 
of some officers unwilling to attend the House.  
 
 
Fig. 11. A dull Nelson: Captain Frederick Cornewall, serial absentee. 
 
 
                                               
16 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. II, p. 253. 
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Cornewall’s stubbornly retiring case aside, the various ways in which naval MPs 
negotiated the conflict between professional and parliamentary obligations is testament to 
the existence of tension between service and representation. This problem plagued naval 
officers more than any other group of representatives within the House of Commons by 
virtue of the intrinsically alienating nature of their profession. Naval officers were 
quarantined for long periods from contact, both physically and socially, with the norms 
and practices of civil society wherein the power of patronage and promotion ultimately 
lay. That officers attempted the difficult balancing act between two sets of commitments 
suggests how important connections to civilian structures of power and patronage were 
considered to be for the furthering of a naval career. 
 
When not absent, the most common contribution of naval officers sitting in the Commons 
was through their votes. Eighteenth century government majorities were cobbled together 
from negotiated deals and intricate webs of alliance between the ministry of the day and 
parliamentary powerbrokers wielding their patronage in the political arena. Members of 
Parliament were generally expected to follow their patrons’ political wishes. Given that 
for many naval MPs, particularly those representing dockyard boroughs, their patron was 
the government, mediated through the Admiralty, and that officers had to retain the 
favour of the presiding administration to ensure good postings to advance their careers, it 
is safe to assume that many, though by no means all, naval members were government 
supporters. We are assured as much in a general sense by the History of Parliament Trust 
in R. G. Thorne’s overview of 1790-1820.17 However, tabulating the voting patterns of a 
specific group like naval MPs from surviving divisional lists is a major task beyond the 
                                               
17 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. I, p. 316. 
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scope of the Trust’s work, and also of this thesis, though a deeper study of voting records 
would undoubtedly yield valuable insights that would give depth and nuance to the 
assertion of general government support. Voting patterns would also show how naval 
MPs fit into evolving party structures, with broad labels such as Whig, Tory, Country and 
Independent glossing over finely graded degrees of loyalty and commitment to 
crystallizing political parties.18 In any case, considering their relatively small numbers (a 
maximum of thirty out of 558 members in any given Parliament), the impact of naval 
MPs’ voting patterns may have been significant, but it could never have been decisive. 
Far more instructive for how naval MPs contributed in an active and meaningful way to 
politics in the House, and happily easier to quantify from the information provided by the 
History of Parliament Trust, is the number and nature of their speeches.  
 
Of those who did manage to attend in the House, the majority followed the eighteenth 
century practice of remaining silent members; it is estimated that less than half of MPs in 
this period ever spoke.19 Records of debates in the eighteenth century are by no means 
comprehensive, and the History of Parliament Trust does not quantify the number of 
Members’ speeches in a consistent way, sometimes giving the dates on which naval MPs 
spoke, or a precise number of speeches (fourteen in the case of Captain Lord Harry 
Powlett, whom we are also told was a bad speaker),20 other times mentioning ‘several’ or 
‘frequent’ speeches in the House. Bearing these vagaries in mind, it is still possible to 
deduce from very patchy information some revealing trends.  
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20 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 314. 
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Apart from the deafening silence of most naval MPs, the increase in naval officers taking 
an active role in the House, as revealed in Figure 12, would appear to be closely linked to 
other developments in the character of naval representation. This increase made inroads 
into predominance of silent parliamentarians, who as a proportion of naval MPs declined 
from 83% between 1715 and 1754 to 57% in 1754-1790 and 49% in the final period up to 
1815. Though it would take further study to satisfactorily account for this trend, a survey 
of the information contained in the History of Parliament Trust suggests that the rise of 
more active membership may be linked to the gentrification of naval parliamentary 
representation. This meant that, as explored above, representatives for Admiralty 
boroughs, dependent on the goodwill of successive governments for their place and 
therefore likely to support the current administration in obedient silence, an exemplar 
being William Cornwallis, in the house for thirty one years without speaking, declined as 
a proportion of naval MPs. 21 Over the time, such men were overshadowed by new groups 
beyond the control of government patronage. These were the more outspoken officers 
whose parliamentary position was grounded in family seats, leavened with naval heroes 
like Vernon and Cochrane, secure enough in their own popularity to be able to pursue an 
independent line in the House.  
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 Fig. 12. Number of naval officers’ speeches in Parliament. 
 
 
 
Within the rising proportion of naval officers who spoke during their term in Parliament, 
the vast majority confined their contribution to debates on naval subjects, which was 
unsurprising given the influence that Parliament had on the service. This control ranged 
from the size of the Navy through regulating its budget in Supply Bills to its codes of 
conduct and discipline, including the regulatory foundations of naval life, the Articles of 
War,22 right down to trivial details of naval minutiae. An excellent example of 
Parliament’s pervasive reach is found in “Standing Order No.7: Hair Powder,” from Sir 
George Elphinstone, now Lord Keith, to the Mediterranean fleet in 1802, which is worth 
repeating in full: 
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Parliament having thought proper to exempt Officers, under certain ranks, from 
the tax imposed on wearing Hair Powder, implies that powder was understood to 
be part of an officer’s dress. It is therefore directed that all Officers on duty wear 
Hair Powder, except at sea or in bad weather; and they are not on any account to 
go on shore in Foreign Parts without that Article of Dress, the want of which 
gives serious Offence to the Inhabitants, and has occasioned great danger to some 
of H.M. Officers in the streets of Naples and Palermo.23 
 
With parliamentary intervention affecting every facet of naval life, naval MPs 
understandably devoted most of their speeches in the House to attempting to guide its 
deliberations on naval affairs. Comments on other topics like Sir George Elphinstone’s 
sole contribution to parliamentary life being a complaint about blocked passages in 
Westminster Hall, Rear Admiral Eliab Harvey’s opposition in 1808 to a veto on 
distillation from grain or Sir Thomas Rich’s declaration in 1785 that “his wish that the 
tax on female servants might not be persisted in” were very much the exception.24  Even 
those who spoke on the more esoteric facets of naval life, such as Captain John 
Bentinck’s sole speech in 1765 on longitude, or the Honourable Charles Paget’s only 
utterance in 1811, in commendation of a new lifebelt based upon “experiments made by 
himself”25 were unusual. The History of Parliament Trust’s volumes suggest that most 
speeches by naval officers were on serious administrative issues like the Navy estimates, 
accusations of corruption and malpractice in the dockyards, impressment of seamen and 
suchlike topics.  
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Forbidden by the custom of the House from reading prepared speeches (perhaps a partial 
explanation for the high percentage of silent members),26 naval members of Parliament 
spoke with varying degrees of elocution and effectiveness. A certain bluff brusqueness 
was expected from a life on the quarterdeck, though the range encompassed within those 
who spoke “in the language of an old sea-dog to the amusement of the House”27 went 
from lucid to positively opaque. The parliamentary recorder Harris notes a typically 
obscure example of Lord Harry Powlett’s “perplexed motions…speaking of the various 
modes of opposition, he told us ‘there was another sort of opposition in the shape of cold 
water, where it ought to breathe nothing but vigour and firmness.’”28 At the other end of 
the spectrum, the Honourable Constantine Phipps spoke with such clarity and force that 
he earned the appellation of the “Marine Lawyer.”29  
 
The manner in which naval officers spoke in the House is not an insignificant point, as it 
reveals a mindset that, uniquely shaped by a lifetime at sea, naval officers were rendered 
less tainted by worldly corruption, a sentiment expressed by Admiral Thomas Pye in 
1773: “I had the mortification to be neglected in my education, went to sea at fourteen 
without any, and a man of war was my university. I therefore attempt to state facts only 
and value myself upon nothing but my integrity and zeal.”30 This tendency towards plain-
speaking, combined with a degree of technical competence assured by the quality-control 
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of the Captain’s Examining Boards gave naval officers with at least a modicum of 
eloquence considerable authority in the House when speaking on naval matters.31 
 
 
Fig.13. Captain John Bentinck, who spoke but once, on longitude, and his son 
William. 
 
Officers who spoke in the Commons in naval debates did so either as private individuals, 
commenting on service matters, defending themselves when their conduct in particular 
operations was called into question by parliamentary inquiries, or conversely accepting 
the praise of the House for victories earned, or speaking as Lords of the Admiralty. These 
officers turned officials, combining professional expertise with an influence on naval 
policy, intervened in the House to justify their decisions on naval strategy and 
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administration to the Commons and, through increasing reportage of parliamentary 
debates, the wider public. Of the five naval MPs who spoke ‘several’ times before 1754, 
Sir John Norris and Sir Charles Wager did so in their capacity as Lords of the Admiralty 
defending the government’s naval policy within the House, setting a trend of relative 
loquacity for those in an official capacity.32 The other three all spoke on naval matters, 
with Vice Admiral and Irish Viscount George Forbes and Admiral Thomas Mathews 
speaking only on the 1745 inquiry into an indecisive engagement off Toulon in the 
previous year, Mathews defending his own actions in command of the fleet on that 
occasion.33 
 
 It was inquiries of this sort, as well as motions of either thanks or censure proposed for 
naval officers, that led to their most active participation in the House. Sir George Brydges 
Rodney, having spent twenty years representing a total of five seats in Parliament spoke 
only once, on 30th November 1781, and that was in response to charges of embezzlement 
and peculation of prize money after the capture of the island of St Eustatius from the 
Dutch in 1781.34 The degree of scandal caused by this action is suggested by the scale of 
the sacking, which yielded over five million pounds in booty, of which 150 000 was 
Rodney’s personal share.35 Likewise, the ongoing clashes in the House between Admirals 
Augustus Keppel and Sir Hugh Palliser, one Whig, one Tory and both MPs, and their 
supporters over the indecisive Battle of Ushant in 1778 and the mutual recriminations and 
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courts-martial that followed,36 reveal that naval officers used the Commons to air 
personal grievances. In this instance, professional enmity was aired in the House with 
such rancour that Palliser retired from public life in 1784, declaring “I feel my mind and 
spirits too much impaired and broken down by ill usage and injustice.”37  
 
The only instance to match the Keppel-Palliser affair for service rivalries being fought 
out in the House was the furore caused by the mercurial and garrulous Captain Lord 
Cochrane, who had disagreed with the conduct of his superior Admiral Lord Gambier 
during an attack on a French squadron in the Basque Roads in 1809. Cochrane therefore 
voted against Parliament’s expression of gratitude, saying in his colourful memoirs that 
“it was my duty…in my capacity as one of the Members of Westminster [to] oppose the 
motion, on the grounds that the Commander-in-Chief had done… nothing to merit a vote 
of thanks.”38 Though Cochrane assured Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty, that 
“in my professional capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any 
opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct,” Mulgrave pointed out in one of the few 
explicit references to the potential conflict of interest in naval officers sitting in the 
House, that “the public would not draw the distinction between my professional and 
parliamentary conduct.”39 Of course, most naval business transacted in the House was not 
so vitriolic, and many officers’ only active contribution to the House was in gracious 
reply to votes of thanks moved by the Commons for victories won and services rendered. 
                                               
36 Rogers, Crowds, Culture, and Politics, pp. 128-129. 
37 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, pp. 247-248. 
38 Brian Vale, ed., Admiral Lord Cochrane, p. 175. 
39 Brian Vale, ed., Admiral Lord Cochrane, pp. 175-176. 
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These included Sir Alexander Hood on 2 November 1795,40 or Sir Samuel Hood (no 
relation), whose reply to the House’s vote of thanks in 1809 was met with “a roar of 
applause, so that he was quite delayed by it from beginning his speech.”41   
 
Congenial though it was to bask in the praise of the House, the speeches remarked upon 
in the History of Parliament Trust shows that officers were as likely to actively agitate for 
improvement in the conditions and pay of the officers and men serving in the Navy as 
they were to defend their conduct and execrate others’. As representatives of the service 
in the Commons as well as their boroughs, naval MPs could make known to the 
Parliament the concerns of the wider profession. Eliab Harvey’s presentation in 1803 of a 
petition urging the reform of abuses in the system for distributing prize money amongst 
the officers and crew of warships capturing enemy vessels is a typical instance,42 as is 
Richard, Lord Howe’s presentation of a petition on behalf of captains in semi-retirement 
on half-pay in 1773.43 These instances of defending the interests of the naval community 
in the House follow in a tradition first established in our period by Sir John Norris, who 
laid before the Commons in 1749 a petition signed by five admirals and fifty-two 
captains against a Bill proposing to alter the 34th Article of War to make semi-retired 
captains on half-pay subject to the full rigours of naval discipline.44  This was an 
understandably unpopular move, as “by this means the whole corps of officers may be 
kept in the utmost subjection and sent where the Admiralty please, even if in 
                                               
40 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. IV, p. 224. 
41 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. IV, p. 225. 
42 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. IV, p. 165. 
43 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. II, p. 647. 
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Parliament.”45 When applied to by the petitioners, Captain Augustus Hervey “entered the 
lists willingly” on their behalf, showing that there was a strong sense of identity and 
shared rights that united officers, which could assert itself through naval spokesmen in 
the House when those rights were perceived to be under threat.46 Cochrane’s support in 
1811 for an investigation into arrears in seamen’s pay47 and Sir John Jervis’ 1792 
proposal of a scheme “to relieve distressed superannuated seamen” likewise reveal 
solicitude for service personnel, though political motives were often read into such 
measures, with Jervis complaining of attempts “to misrepresent my motives, to describe 
them as a meditated attack on the Admiralty, and thereby prejudice me in the service.”48  
 
The tension that could arise between a naval officers’ sense of paternalistic, pastoral care 
for sailors and satisfying the requirements of patrons upon which a seat in the House was 
contingent is neatly summarized by Horace Walpole’s account of Sir Charles Saunders’ 
opposition to the Clandestine Marriages Bill of 1753. Though he spoke against the Bill 
“for the sake of the sailors, having once given forty of his crew leave to go on shore for 
an hour, and all returned married,” Saunders was nonetheless obliged to vote for it by his 
patron Lord Anson, who had in turn married the daughter of the Lord Chancellor, 
Hardwicke, whose Bill it was.49 The varied topics on which naval officers spoke in the 
House, ranging from the trivial and tangential to impassioned pleas for improvement of 
sailors’ welfare to the airing of acrimonious service rivalries shows that many naval MPs 
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actively engaged in parliamentary life, ensuring that the Navy had a significant place in 
public discourse at the heart of government.  
 
 
 66 
Chapter Five: Death, Compromise and Reward: How 
Naval Officers left Parliament 
 
 
Equally revealing as to why and how naval MPs functioned as a nexus between politics 
and their profession is the manner in which naval officers left the House of Commons.  
Many naval MPs died in office, some chose not to stand again, had their patronage 
withdrawn or lost elections, while others surrendered their seats to concentrate on their 
careers at sea or to take up sinecures and offices incompatible with sitting in the House. 
A lucky few ascended to the other chamber when they succeeded to family titles, or were 
ennobled for military, political or administrative services by a grateful nation, or to be 
more accurate, a grateful government, which is by no means the same thing. 
 
 How naval officers serving in the House of Commons became increasingly politicized is 
underlined by the manner in which they left their House, and it is instructive that no naval 
MP lost an election before 1774. This doubtless reflects the greater stability of 
parliamentary politics in the earlier part of the century, particularly in the long Whig 
ascendancy under Sir Robert Walpole until 1742, then the rise of the Tories under the 
Duke of Newcastle until the destabilization of the 1760s and 1780s.1 Prior to this, officers 
were far more likely to leave the House through death rather than by failing at the 
hustings, as Figure 14 shows. Between 1715 and 1754, death ended twenty-five out of 
forty-two naval MPs’ parliamentary careers. That only nineteen out of sixty-four officers 
between 1754 and 1790 died as Members of Parliament, less than a third as opposed to 
over a half for the earlier period, shows that a comfortable seat in the House was not to be 
                                               
1 Hill, The Growth of Parliamentary Parties, p. 28. 
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relied upon in the same way as previously. This tendency reflects the increasingly 
unsettled nature of politics, a trend that was accentuated between 1790 and 1815, when 
only sixteen of seventy-five naval MPs died in office, a mere 16 % compared to earlier 
figures.  
 
Death
Patronage withdrawn
Not stand for re-election
Acquire peerage
Return to exclusively
naval service
Lost Elections
Took incompatible
appointment
 
Fig.14. Naval officers’ means of leaving Parliament 
 
What is initially surprising in a study of an age of horrible wounds, when wooden worlds 
splintered in battle and dimly-understood diseases born of malnutrition and service in the 
tropics were rampant is how few of the naval officers who sat in the House of Commons 
perished on active duty when mortality in their profession was quite high.2 The wear of 
active naval service did have an effect, however, with three officers explicitly recorded 
by the History of Parliament Trust as not standing for re-election due to illness, and there 
may be more officers who gave up a parliamentary career due to the toll exacted by a life 
                                               
2 William Barwick Hodge, ‘On the Mortality Arising from Naval Operations,’ Journal of the Statistical 
Society of London, 18, no.3 (September 1855), p. 201. 
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at sea.3 Of the sixty naval officers who died while Members of Parliament, only two, 
Thomas Grenville and Lord Robert Manners, perished in action, while Sir Thomas 
Troubridge and the Honourable Robert Walsingham were lost at sea in storms, the latter 
being elected posthumously.4 Disease was more dangerous than battle, with four deaths at 
sea from unspecified causes and Lords William Proby and Augustus Fitzroy as well as 
the Honourable Edward Legge all succumbing to the febrile climate of the West Indies, 
the latter theoretically sitting in Parliament only for four days before news of his death 
some months before was announced.5 The unfortunate John Byng had a death related to 
his service when he was condemned by court-martial and executed in 1757.6 Of the 
remaining naval officers who died MPs, they were claimed by natural causes ranging 
from the banal to the bizarre, including the Honourable John Leveson-Gower’s end in an 
apoplectic fit whilst shaving, or the inglorious demise of Admiral Peter Rainier, too 
corpulent to permit an ulcer on his thigh to be operated upon.7 The scarcity of deaths 
occurring at sea is a strong indication of the age and character of a significant proportion 
of naval MPs, with many sea officers quite elderly, particularly in Admiralty boroughs, 
enjoying a seat in the Commons as an honour and occupation at an age when no longer fit 
for active service, though this practice clearly declined as the century progressed. 
 
If the nature of entry to and representation in Parliament altered over the course of the 
century with the increasing presence of aristocratic younger sons in the House, Members’ 
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means of exiting the Commons also grew more gentrified as time progressed, with a 
small but increasing tendency for naval MPs of non-noble birth to be raised to the 
peerage, generally as a reward for a successful fleet action. Sir George Byng in 1721 and 
George Anson in 1747 were the only two officers to be so honoured before the War of 
American Independence,8 and like most of the MPs to follow, this mark of esteem was 
largely due to service, as with the brothers Hood in 1796 and Sir George Elphinstone in 
1801.9 Naval MPs could also be elevated to the peerage by dint of their administrative 
services as Lords of the Admiralty, with Sir Edward Hawke, Constantine Phipps and 
Alan Gardner being ennobled in 1776, 1790 and 1801 respectively.10  
 
Although comparatively few naval MPs were ennobled between 1715 and 1815, only ten 
in all, almost a third of these elevations to the peerage occurred in 1782, which saw 
Richard Howe, Augustus Keppel and Sir George Brydges Rodney granted patents of 
nobility in one fell swoop.11 The year 1782 saw the fall of the North government, which 
had long presided over the many failures of the War of American Independence, and the 
new Shelburne administration created several peers when it swept to power. Though 
Rodney was in bad odour with the new government, having in fact been superseded in 
command, he had won the Battle of the Saintes before his replacement had arrived to 
relieve him. This victory established him as such a popular hero that the new 
administration was obliged to recommend his creation as a peer to forestall public anger 
                                               
8 Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754, vol. I, pp. 415, 511. 
9 Thorne, The House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. III, p. 705, vol. IV, pp. 224-225. 
10 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. II, p. 596, vol. III, p. 277, Thorne, The 
House of Commons 1790-1820, vol. IV, p. 3. 
11 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790
 70 
at his recall.12 The other ennoblements of this year, of Richard Howe and Augustus 
Keppel, were in reward for loyal and vociferous support of the new government from the 
opposition benches after both officers had met with professional disappointment and 
scandal earlier in the war.13 The politics surrounding the elevations to the peerage in 1782 
reveal how the interplay between professional and parliamentary considerations, as well 
as the increasing intrusion of popular politics into public life could affect the manner in 
which naval MPs left the Commons as well as the way they entered it.  This complex 
interaction is demonstrated by Rodney’s noble apotheosis being forced upon the 
government by a fear of public opinion. While the elevation of Howe and Keppel reflect 
a more traditional reward for service, there was a twist in that their service was rendered 
in opposition, using the professional standing and gravitas of naval officers to strengthen 
parliamentary attacks on the previous government’s wartime conduct. 
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Fig. 15.Admiral Augustus Keppel, created Viscount Keppel for services against the 
government. 
 
 
 
Though the vast majority of naval MPs saw no difficulty in simultaneously being naval 
officers as well as sitting in the House of Commons, there were some who expressed 
qualms at the possible conflict between professional and parliamentary obligations. Some 
did so explicitly, as in the case of Sir Charles Middleton, who wrote to William Pitt the 
Younger in 1789 venting his concern at “the impropriety of my representing a borough so 
intimately connected with the civil department of the Navy as Rochester.”14 Middleton 
resolved this particular conflict of interest by not standing again in 1790, a decision 
perhaps influenced by devotion to the “novel and alarming doctrines of the Evangelical 
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movement.”15 Quite apart from moral qualms over the separation of powers, the 
eighteenth century Navy placed commitments of a global scale on its personnel that 
forced many to choose between professional careers afloat or political careers ashore. 
Even duties such as commanding dockyard facilities in Britain could impair the political 
functioning of a naval MP, for example the aforementioned James Steuart, whose posting 
at Portsmouth affected his career in the House as much as if he had been overseas.16 
Several officers tried to solve the competing demands of active service at sea and 
attendance in the House by implicitly resolving the conflict of interest in favour of one 
side or the other. A substantial list of officers, including St John Charlton, Peter Parker, 
the Honourable George Heneage Lawrence Dundas, John Poo Beresford and Sir Charles 
Hamilton either retired from the House or did not seek re-election in order to seek active 
service at sea.17  
 
For others, a posting to distant parts of the globe made untenable the maintenance of 
political leverage in politics ashore that a seat in the House represented. In this category 
can be counted Sir John Lindsay, Charles Wolseley and Sir Edward Pellew when posted 
to the East Indies, Sir John Borlase Warren when sent to the North American station, Sir 
Samuel Hood to India or Sir Home Riggs Popham to the Cape of Good Hope, who all 
gave up their seats to go overseas.18 None, however, were as dramatic as Thomas, Lord 
Cochrane, who resigned the seat of Westminster in 1818 when, having been 
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professionally ruined four years before in a trial for Stock Exchange Fraud, he gave up 
the rhetoric of radical politics for the practice of leading the Navies of Chile, Brazil and 
Greece against their colonial overlords.19 Though Harry Burrard took formal leave of 
absence from the House to attend to his naval duties in 1795, in general terms it seems 
that for a sizeable sample of naval MPs, this conflict of interest was insoluble without 
giving up either Parliament or the Navy.20 
 
While many naval officers clearly felt the value of a seat in Parliament was worth the 
time, effort and expense involved in the cultivation of a patron or an electorate, the 
civilian world of eighteenth century politics also had uses for naval officers. While the 
marketability or ‘brand power’ of naval heroes to electorates too large to be controlled by 
a single patron or interest has already been discussed, the difficulty imposed on naval 
MPs in attempting to draw advantage from their seat by frequent absences was a positive 
asset to many patrons. Naval officers frequently represented boroughs in Parliament as 
stopgaps to hold their seats temporarily on behalf of others, though how far their 
suitability for this role was based upon their naval character and how much upon their 
social and familial status largely as younger sons of the aristocracy and landowning 
gentry is unclear. Twenty-two naval officers lost their seats in the House when their 
patron transferred their support to another candidate. For officers of aristocratic 
extraction, it was quite common to be obliged to step down in favour of another relation, 
particularly nephews of the senior line of the family coming of age. Similarly, a blue-
blooded naval MP might find his patronage withdrawn if his candidature should prove 
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too much of a financial burden to his family, as in the case of John Montagu, a relation of 
another John Montagu, the 4th Earl of Sandwich. This magnate, First Lord of the 
Admiralty and inventor of the eponymous snack, refused to pay the election expenses of 
his kinsman in 1754, thus bringing to an end the younger Montagu’s parliamentary 
career.21  
 
Naval officers were also useful at filling vacancies occasioned by unexpected events, 
such as John Fish (of Castle Fish) holding Wexford for the Irish powerbroker and family 
friend Richard Nevill during his illness until Nevill recovered. In happier circumstances, 
Captain Temple West briefly sat for in Buckingham in 1753 to fill the gap occasioned by 
his distant cousin Richard Grenville’s elevation to the peerage as Lord Cobham.22  Naval 
officers sitting in Parliament sometimes found themselves unceremoniously ejected when 
their patrons no longer cared to accommodate them, as in the case of Samuel Campbell 
Rowley, who stepped aside in 1806 to make way for a nominee who had purchased his 
erstwhile patron’s interest. Likewise, the Honourable Courtenay Boyle was not 
nominated again in 1807 when it was the other patron’s turn to select a candidate in the 
shared borough of Bandon Bridge.23 Almost overwhelmingly, patrons dropped clients, 
though some naval MPs refused to stand again when offered a difficult or contested 
borough, or as in the case of the Honourable John Rodney, son of the victor of the 
Saintes, an officer could decline the patrons’ terms if he found them uncongenial, as the 
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younger Rodney did to the Duke of Northumberland in 1796 for Launceston.24  Of 
course, such placeholding did not invariably work against naval MPs; indeed, Captain 
Pownall Bastard Pellew owed his representation of Launceston from 1812 onwards to his 
father Sir Edward Pellew’s absence in the East Indies, holding the seat until the elder 
Pellew’s return. As his father was created Viscount Exmouth on arriving in England in 
1816, just beyond this study, the younger Pellew remained as the representative of 
Launceston beyond the bounds of this study until 1829.25 Just how the majority of naval 
officers who did not hold Admiralty seats interacted with the patrons who placed them 
there is only hinted at by this brief overview. To what extent the profession of naval MPs 
placed unusual strains on the relationship between patron and client remains to be 
determined from a more comprehensive study of surviving correspondence. What is 
clear, however, is that naval officers fulfilled a number of roles in the intricate, delicately 
balanced machinery of eighteenth century politics, and patrons found them desirable, or 
at least useful candidates, even if some of them were little more than disposable fillers 
and stopgaps.  
 
If some naval MPs found their parliamentary careers terminated when their continued 
tenure in the House no longer suited patrons’ arrangements, there was also a small but 
significant group that chose to retire from the House themselves when faced with 
professional disappointment. Although promotion up the various grades of flag rank were 
governed by seniority,26 and their attainment therefore largely immune from political 
influence, officers’ employment was far more open to political manipulation. As senior 
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officers often looked upon certain choice commands as theirs by right, they were liable to 
keen disenchantment when others junior to them were appointed in their place. The 
professional disappointment of figures such as Sir John Jennings, Rear-Admiral of 
England, when junior Sir John Norris was appointed Commander-in-Chief over his head, 
seemed to resonate in their parliamentary careers, as Norris both resigned from the 
service and refused to stand for the Admiralty seat of Rochester, both in 1734.27 
Similarly, Admiral Sir George Pocock took offence in 1766 after forty-eight years’ 
service at sea when the new Chatham Administration appointed his junior Sir Charles 
Saunders as First Lord of the Admiralty. Pocock was moved to write to Chatham saying 
“I take the liberty to…express my surprise you should put such an indignity as I find your 
Lordship has, upon fifteen flag officers” senior to Saunders, leading him to retire from 
the service, and stop attending Parliament until the election of 1768, when he did not 
stand.28  
 
That professional disappointment could manifest itself in withdrawal from Parliament as 
well as from the Navy suggests a connection in the minds of eighteenth century officers 
in which political ambition was linked to professional advancement, with the former 
being given up if the latter was not attained. These fits of pique did not seem to work in 
the opposite direction, however. When patrons withdrew their support from officers in 
the House, as discussed above, naval MPs did not also throw in their careers as officers, 
strongly suggesting that naval Members vested more meaning in their character and 
identity as naval officers than in their status as Members of the Commons. 
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Another, less disagreeable way for naval Members of Parliament to leave the House was 
to take up remunerative postings that were incompatible with sitting in the Commons. 
Despite a growing clamour for reform, there remained hundreds of offices, many of so 
little utility as to be pure sinecures, in the gift of ministers who could therefore bestow 
substantial emolument on venal friends and followers, including the occasional naval 
MP.29 Even the easy-going eighteenth century set some limits to the cupidity of men 
whose offices might compromise their political integrity, with Postmasters excluded from 
the franchise in the reign of Queen Anne, and Customs and Revenue Officers in 1782 in 
an attempt to curb the effect of patronage in the Commons.30 The choice presented by the 
offer of such a post is substantially clearer than in the case of offices that could be held 
concurrently with Membership of the House, and little evidence understandably remains 
of such potentially murky transactions suggestive of buying support in Parliament.31  
 
That conflict of interest aside, some naval officers forced to choose between a seat in the 
House and a lucrative sinecure chose the latter. Such postings could take the form of 
colonial governorships, as in the case of Captain Lord William Campbell, who retired 
from Argyllshire in 1766 to become Governor of Nova Scotia, likewise Captains William 
Trelawny and Charles Knowles who resigned their seats to assume gubernatorial 
responsibility for Jamaica in 1752 and 1767 respectively.32 Naval MPs who chose to 
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become Revenue Officers also had to give up their parliamentary careers, like the 
Honourable Keith Stewart, who left Wigtownshire in 1784 to become Receiver-General 
of the Land Tax in Scotland, or Galfridus Walpole, whose father’s nepotism and exalted 
station as Prime Minister secured him the Postmaster-Generalship in 1721 at the cost of 
his seat.33 There were even a few specifically naval postings that could render an officer 
ineligible to sit in the Commons, as in the case of Robert Fanshawe, who resigned 
Plymouth in 1790 to become Commissioner of its dockyard, following the example set by 
Captain Paul Henry Ourry in 1775.34  
 
Apart from the inherent conflict of interest in being at once both a naval officer and a 
Member of Parliament, many naval MPs held other postings that did not disqualify them 
from the House, particularly the Lords of the Admiralty and Comptrollers of the Navy. 
Nonetheless, some officers were placed by statutory exclusions in the position of 
choosing between an active political career and the financial security of a comfortable 
sinecure, usually settling for the tangible reward offered rather than the putative hope of 
better things to come through Parliament. Just how far the gaining of such preferment 
was a reward for their abilities and merit, both professional and parliamentary, and how 
far it was due to the all-pervasive workings of patronage and interest is not entirely clear. 
It is, however, certainly ironic that legislation designed to limit abuses of patronage 
within the House by making holders of particularly remunerative sinecures ineligible to 
sit there merely resulted in those naval MPs offered such positions to yield their seats 
with alacrity.  
                                               
33 Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754, vol. II, p. 508, Namier and Brooke, The House of 
Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, p. 483. 
34 Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons 1754-1790, vol. III, pp. 240, 414. 
 79 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
On one level, this thesis has aimed to offer tantalizing glimpses into a hitherto secluded 
aspect of British, parliamentary and naval history. Naval officers sitting in the House of 
Commons have been demonstrated to be a group of diverse background who entered into 
and acted in Parliament in ways suggesting their integration into complex systems of 
patronage ashore and afloat, increasingly tempered by the force of popular politics. The 
superficially contradictory character of  naval officers like Sir George Elphinstone, 
exalted with praise and honours for his achievements, sitting in the Commons for 
fourteen years and speaking only once, has been contextualized within naval, 
parliamentary and popular eighteenth century milieus. By considering the changing 
composition of naval MPs as a group over time according to their background, age, rank, 
means of entering and leaving Parliament as well as their activities in the Commons, this 
thesis has outlined a picture of dynamic nuance on a neglected topic hitherto 
impoverished by static generalization.  
 
The intricacies of their naval and political careers make the 182 naval officers who sat in 
Parliament between 1715 and 1815 worthy of further study in their own right, but this 
kind of prosopographical analysis is even more valuable in representing a largely fresh 
avenue from which to approach both naval and parliamentary history, and the evolving 
links between the two. Combined with consideration of the growing importance of print 
media and popular culture throughout the eighteenth century, such an analysis would 
yield deeper insight into what this thesis has shown to be a potent nexus of parliamentary, 
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Though an investigation of this sort was not feasible within the parameters of this work, 
the possible dividends of understanding that could be reaped from its analytical 
foundations are manifold. As a final example, the heated exchange mentioned above 
between Captain Lord Cochrane and the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1809 over 
Cochrane’s refusal to join a vote of thanks to a fellow naval commander is particularly 
revealing.1 Cochrane’s intransigence and Lord Mulgrave’s responses entwined concepts 
of parliamentary and professional obligation as well as courage, honour, duty and the 
place of both institutions in the national psyche. The First Lord’s terse reply that “the 
public would not draw the distinction between [Cochrane’s] professional and 
parliamentary conduct,” is one of the very few instances in which a conflict between 
professional and parliamentary interest was explicitly articulated in the eighteenth 
century.2 Such a comment would seem to indicate by its very rarity that, upon the whole, 
naval MPs felt few qualms about their dual role, which begs the question of why this was 
so?  
 
Perhaps the answer is found in how both Parliament and Navy were thought of in similar 
ideological terms, with the protection of English liberties being vested in both 
institutions, though of course in different ways. Captain Lord Cochrane may have 
regretted the “public want of discrimination”3 when Lord Mulgrave said that the press 
and populace would not distinguish between remarks as a Member of Parliament distinct 
from a naval officer, perhaps because the uniquely naval character of his representation in 
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the Commons was widely considered to be indissoluble from and integral to his place in 
public life.  
 
Even if the cultural capital generated by the Navy over the course of the century by its 
many victories had not caused it to loom large in the public imagination as a physical and 
ideological defence of English liberties, the sheer size of the Navy and its shore 
establishment dictated a substantial impact upon Great Britain at a seminal stage in the 
formation of a national identity. As the Navy was growing both physically as well as in 
the place it and its officers occupied in the press, public opinion and Parliament itself, so 
too was the House of Commons growing more important as an arena in which popular 
contentions, which as we have seen increasingly encompassed naval matters, were played 
out.4 How this expansion, of the Navy, of Parliament and of their public sphere was 
interrelated deserves more study, as does the place of the former two in the latter. The 
importance of the Navy in the eyes of press and public has been touched upon in the most 
salient examples of Admirals Vernon, Keppel and Cochrane by historians such as 
Kathleen Wilson and Nicholas Rogers; however, an examination of what impact the 
presence of a large group of naval officers at the legislative hub of the nation had upon 
the press and popular opinion has yet to be attempted. 
 
 If nothing more than an extension of the analysis undertaken in this thesis was conducted 
over a wider period of the History of Parliament Trust’s volumes, we would enjoy a 
greater understanding of the effect that naval officers sitting in the Commons had on the 
                                               
4 Charles Tilly, ‘Parliamentarization of Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834,’ Theory and 
Society, 26, no. 2/3, Special Double Issue on New Directions in Formalization and Historical Analysis 
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Royal Navy, Parliament and the nation at large. How the trends revealed in this study, 
showcasing 182 naval officers over a century as a group of sometimes similar, sometimes 
heterogeneous characteristics, would alter from 1715 back to the Glorious Revolution of 
16885 or the reconstitution of a professional Navy under the Restoration, or forwards 
from 1815 to the Reform Act of 1832 and beyond is yet to be determined.  Building upon 
the foundations laid by analyses such as this one, how far the patterns sifted from the 
History of Parliament Trust’s raw data are reflected and given depth in contemporary 
correspondence and print media is the real question raised by this study, which by virtue 
of its limited scope can only touch upon a rich vein of largely untapped historical inquiry.  
 
While the simultaneous expansion of the Navy and of a consumerist culture feeding upon 
memorabilia and print media lauding the exploits of the service have been examined in 
isolated periods,6 a comprehensive study of the links between the two would offer further 
insights into the creation of a uniquely British identity in the eighteenth century. The 
most salient examples of the interplay between press, Parliament and the Navy, the 
famous cases of Admirals Vernon and Keppel, have been extensively treated; what has 
not been attempted is to examine how the relationship between the profile created by the 
press for naval officers and Parliament changed over time. The prominent place that the 
Navy enjoyed as one of the prime mediators between Britain and the outside world 
ensured that it would also play a part in the strengthening conflation throughout the 
period of nationalism and identity in the creation of an “Island Race.” It is therefore 
important to examine how this association coloured its representatives and representation 
                                               
5 J Davies, ‘The Navy, Parliament and Political Crisis in the Reign of Charles II,’ The Historical Journal, 
36, no.2 (June 1993), p. 272. 
6 McKendrick, Brewer and Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society
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in Parliament, with naval officers increasingly respected in popular culture as repositories 
of distinctly British liberties and virtues.7  With the Navy a muscular contributor in a very 
tangible sense to the imperialism and triumphalism (largely built on naval triumphs)8 that 
helped implant in domestic politics and culture a new sense of Britishness, its role in this 
process deserves greater treatment. Likewise, the impact of the connections formed 
between the Royal Navy’s officers in Parliament upon Britain’s expanding empire, which 
until significantly into the nineteenth century relied upon such informal networks, 
remains to be explored.9  
 
As the Royal Navy provided the raw material of victories and glory upon which a 
sharpened sense of popular imperialism and patriotism was in large part founded,10 
incorporating the findings of this study with more qualitative research would correct a 
deficiency currently found in otherwise vibrant scholarship of imperialism and popular 
culture in eighteenth century Britain. Such work would enrich these as well as more 
traditional fields of inquiry such as naval and parliamentary history. Further study of 
officers’ correspondence, pamphlets, prints and all the paraphernalia of electioneering 
would doubtless explore the complexities of the hypotheses that could only be touched 
upon in a work of limited scope such as this. This field would benefit from attention to 
qualitative analysis that could not be properly explored through the largely quantitative 
research upon which this thesis is founded, for the broad outlines of officers’ practices 
                                               
7 Wilson, The Island Race, p. 55. 
8 Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 179. 
9 Zoe Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, pp. 13-16. 
10 Kathleen Wilson, ‘Empire, Trade and Popular Politics in Mid-Hanoverian Britain: The Case of Admiral 
Vernon,’ Past and Present, no. 121 (November 1988), p. 75. 
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and presence in the House of Commons certainly suggest avenues of investigation that 
would richly reward further research.  
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